Adaptive Proofs of Knowledge in the Random Oracle Model

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Dive into the world of adaptive proofs of knowledge in the random oracle model, exploring topics such as interactive proofs, non-interactive proofs, and extraction challenges. Discover the intricacies of simulation-sound adaptive zero-knowledge proofs and the importance of adversaries and extractors in cryptographic security.

  • Proofs of Knowledge
  • Random Oracle Model
  • Cryptography
  • Adaptive Zero-Knowledge
  • Extraction

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  1. Adaptive Proofs of Knowledge in the Random Oracle Model 21. PKC 2015 Marc Fischlin joint work with David Bernhard, Bogdan Warinschi 13. Oktober 2010 | Dr.Marc Fischlin | Kryptosicherheit | 1

  2. (Interactive) Proofs of Knowledge theorem interactive proof extractor (malicious) prover witness extraction usually through rewinding April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 2

  3. [Fiat-Shamir] Non-interactive Proofs of Knowledge in the Random Oracle (RO) Model RO * RO non-interactive extractor (malicious) prover still require rewinding for extraction April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 3

  4. Extraction is easy in the RO model [Pointcheval-Stern] Example: Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr signatures RO RO* April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 4

  5. Extraction is easy in the RO model or is it? April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 5

  6. adaptive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge in random oracle model (ROM) [Shoup-Gennaro] adversary RO RO RO April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 6

  7. simulation-sound adaptive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge in the ROM ? needs to program RO needs to program RO RO extractor ZK simulator April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 7

  8. This work here: Model for simulation-sound adaptive ZK PoKs in ROM Show that one can work with it Show that one can achieve it Discuss that some approaches fail April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 8

  9. main execution (non-rewinding) RO list of queries RO same coins local branches adversary wins if extractor at some point fails to compute witness PPT adversaries extractor: Pr [ adversary wins ] is negligible April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 9

  10. Result #1 (applicability): CPA-secure encryption + simulation-sound adaptive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in ROM I know message and randomness encrypted under CPA scheme CCA-secure encryption in ROM so far: common reference string model [Groth, Chase-Lysanskaya, Dodis et al.] April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 10

  11. Result #2 (feasibility): Fischlin s transformation with straightline extractor for protocols with special soundness is simulation-sound adaptive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the ROM so far: only shown for adaptive scenario in [Fischlin] April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 11

  12. RO RO Idea: straightline extractor in Fischlin s scheme only needs hash queries of adversary April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 12

  13. Result #3 (limitations): Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr transformation is not adaptive proof of knowledge under one-more DL assumption (for black-box extractors). so far: certain extractor strategy fails [Shoup-Gennaro] here: any efficient extractor strategy fails April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 13

  14. [Bellare et al.] One-More-DL Problem Ch A DL output more solutions to challenges than DL queries April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 14

  15. RO Ch RO DL Metareduction output more solutions to challenges than DL queries April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 15

  16. RO Ch RO DL use [Shoup-Gennaro] adversary here Metareduction output more solutions to challenges than DL queries April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 16

  17. Ch RO DL make at most 2 calls to DL for each use [Shoup-Gennaro] adversary here Metareduction if extractor requires less than 2 executions to extract output more solutions to challenges than DL queries for some , then metareduction solves OMDL problem April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 17

  18. Final step in the proof (not here): If extractor requires 2 executions to extract for each then Shoup-Gennaro adversary forces exponential number of executions combinatorial, via execution tree April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 18

  19. Take-home Message April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 19

  20. RO RO CPA + ss-adaptive PoK CCA in ROM Fischlin s transformation is an example for ss-adaptive PoK Fiat-Shamir transformation in general is (presumably) not 1. 2. 3. April 1st, 2015 | Marc Fischlin | PKC 2015 | 20

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