Architectural Side-Channel Attacks: Reality Unveiled
Discover the insidious world of architectural side-channel attacks in the realm of information security through a comprehensive lecture series. Delve into the vulnerabilities present in modern systems and the potential risks posed by such attacks. Uncover the techniques, exploits, and implications of these attacks on sensitive data and systems. Stay informed and prepared in the battle against emerging cyber threats.
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Presentation Transcript
Information Security Theory vs. Reality 0368-4474, Winter 2015-2016 Lecture 2: Architectural side-channels (2/2) Lecturer: Eran Tromer 1
Architectural side-channel attacks (cont.) 3
L3 Flush+Reload attack [Yarom Falkner 2014] Target outermost cache, shared between all CPU cores (typically L3) RSA key extraction from GnuPG 1.4.13 Target specific memory block (instead of cache set) Exploits memory deduplication (content- based page sharing) Common code, libraries, data across VMs Supposedly safe (nominally, no new information flow) 4
L3 flush+reload attack on GnuPGs RSA [Yarom Falkner 2014] 6
Other attacks on RSA ALU multiplier attack [Aciicmez Seifert 2007] Cache attack using HyperThreading [Percival 05] cache set Attacker s MUL time time time MUL SQR SQR SQR SQR Victim s operation 7
Other architectural attacks (Whiteboard discussion) Covert channels Hardware-assisted Power trace Timing attacks via internal collisions Model-less timing attacks RSA Exploiting the scheduler Improve temporal resolution by causing victim to get tiny time slice Instruction cache Exploits difference between code paths Attacks are analogous to data cache attack Branch prediction Exploits difference in choice of code path BP state is a shared resource ALU resources Exploits contention for the multiplication units Many followups [Hu 91, 92] [Page 02] [Tsunoo Tsujihara Minematsu Miyuachi 02] [Tsunoo Saito Suzaki Shigeri Miyauchi 03] [Bernstein 04] [Percival 05] [Neve Seifrert 07] Aciicmez 07] [Aciicmez Schindler Koc 06 07] [Aciicmez Seifert 07] 8
Mitigation (classroom discussion) 9
