Composable Randomness Beacons and Output-Independent MPC from Time

craft craft c composable r randomness beacons n.w
1 / 15
Embed
Share

"Explore the world of Composable Randomness Beacons, Verifiable Delay Functions, and Output-Independent MPC in this informative research paper. Understand Time Lock Puzzles and their role in secure computations within a Universally Composable framework."

  • Composable
  • Randomness
  • MPC
  • VDFs
  • Time

Uploaded on | 0 Views


Download Presentation

Please find below an Image/Link to download the presentation.

The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author. If you encounter any issues during the download, it is possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

You are allowed to download the files provided on this website for personal or commercial use, subject to the condition that they are used lawfully. All files are the property of their respective owners.

The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. CRAFT CRAFT: C Composable R Randomness Beacons and Output-Independent A Abort MPC F From T Time Carsten Baum1,2, Bernardo David3, Rafael Dowsley4, Ravi Kishore3, Jesper Buus Nielsen2, Sabine Oechsner5 1Technical University of Denmark, Denmark 2Aarhus University, 3IT University of Copenhagen 4Monash University, 5University of Edinburgh

  2. Agenda Introduction to Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) and Time Lock Puzzles (TLPs) TARDIS model of Abstract Composable Time Provable Sequential Computations in Universally Composable (UC) framework. Constructions of UC VDFs, and UC Publicly Verifiable (PV) TLPs MPC with Output Independent Abort (OIA-MPC) from UC PV TLPs Efficient unbiasable randomness beacons from UC PV TLPs Future Works

  3. Introduction VDF is function, and its Output is generated only after performing a certain number of computational steps. Along with the output, VDF outputs a proof that guarantees that this number of steps has been performed to obtain the output. Proof can be verified in time essentially independent of the number of steps. Time Lock Puzzles (TLPs) allow encrypting a message to the future . For constructing and modeling TLPs we need a computational task that must be executed in sequential steps taking at least some time. [RSW96] introduced the first construction, based on the hardness of iterated squaring of elements from groups with unknown order.

  4. Introduction Iterated squaring time lock assumption from [RSW96]: Let N=p*q, where p and q are generated as in RSA key generation Let ( /? ) be the group of primitive residues modulo N For a random element ? ( /? ) computing ?2?takes at least as much time as it takes to compute T sequential squarings ?21,?22,?23, ,?2?. [RSW96] builds a TLP containing a message ? that can be extracted after T steps by computing TLP = (?,???) where ? = 2?mod ?(?) If each squaring step takes at least some time s, the TLP can be solved in time at least s*T by computing ??with T sequential squarings and obtaining ? = ???? ?.

  5. Our Contributions UC treatment of Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) UC treatment of Publicly Verifiable Time Lock Puzzles (PV-TLPs) UC MPC with output independent abort (OIA-MPC) UC MPC with Punishable Output Independent Abort (POIA-MPC) Efficient UC Randomness Beacon from PV-TLP

  6. Related works UC (Global) Clock Functionalities [KMTZ13][KZZ16][BDDNO21] Modeling wall clocks, parties/functionalities can ask for current time [KMTZ13][KZZ16]. Functionalities can ask only if a new tick has happened since the last tick [BDDNO21]. Stand alone (malleable) Time Lock Puzzles [RSW96] and VDFs based on iterated squaring [W19] Non-malleable Time Lock Puzzles [KLX20][EFKP20] Non-malleability is trivially implied by our UC security guarantees. Do not have composability guarantees, so can be constructed without programmable random oracles (but [KLX] requires CRS and [EFKP20] requires observable ROs). [KLX20] is based on iterated squaring but [EFKP20] builds on standard TLPs and VDFs. Partial Fairness for 2PC using standard TLPs [CRR19] No composability guarantees, restricted to 2 parties. UC TLPs and 2PC with output independent abort [BDDNO21].

  7. TARDIS model of Abstract Composable Time No more Global Clock, in its place we have a Global Ticker telling only functionalities time has passed but not how much time. Parties don t get ticking information but observe events from functionalities and acknowledge they have been activated Global Ticker

  8. Modeling Provable Sequential Computations in UC FPSC captures the notion of a generic stand alone trapdoor VDFs FPSC allows both computing and verifying the sequential proofs Parties can ask for advancing it to the new state during a Tick, but it advances only after the next Tick Global functionality, meaning neither environment/simulator have special power over it (e.g. doing fast computation than allowed). Tick=i Tick=i-1 FPSC FPSC AdvanceState AdvanceState Advance State Advance State if i >= T else (st0, T, stT, ) (st(i-1), i, sti, ) FPSC Trapdoor Solve Adv gets Trapdoor Solve Trapdoor Solve Solve (Solve, st0, T) Solve if i=T (st0, T, stT, ) no info is revealed Party gets Verify else Verify Verify

  9. Modeling Provable Sequential Computations in UC Tick=i Tick=i-1 FPSC FPSC Advance State Advance State AdvanceState AdvanceState Trapdoor Solve Trapdoor Solve if i = g(T) Party gets (Verified, st0, T, stT, , b) Verify(st0, T, stT, ) Solve Solve Verify Verify FPSC Advance State FPSC TdSolve(st0, T) Trapdoor Solve (st0, T, stT, ) Trapdoor Solve Solve Verify Verify

  10. Our UC VDF Construction Each partyuses a new instance of FPSC for each VDF with no access to trapdoor interface. His a Global Random Oracle Evaluating VDF with input in in T steps 1. Picks a random st0 from state space. 2. Sets st0=in and Sends (Solve, st0,T) to FPSC 3. After T steps, Receives (st0,T, stT, ) 4. Sets out=H(T|stT| ), and proof=(stT, ) Verify the output out obtained from input in with the proof proof. 1. Parse proof=(stT, ) 2. Compute out =H(T|stT| ) 3. Check if out = out

  11. Our UC PV TLP Construction POWNER uses a new instance of FPSC for each TLP H1 and H2 are Global Random Oracles Solve (st0,tag1,tag2) 1. Compute stT sequentially and get 2. Compute h1=H1(st0|T|stT| ) 3. Compute m = tag1 h1 4. Compute h2=H2(st0|T|stT| |tag1|m) 5. Check that tag2=h2 6. Output m if all checks succeed. Create TLP with message m and T steps 1. Picks a random st0 from state space. 2. Sends (TdSolve, st0,T) to FPSC 3. Receives (st0,T, stT, ) 4. Compute h1=H1(st0|T|stT| ) 5. Set tag1 = h1 m 6. Compute h2=H2(st0|T|stT| |tag1|m) 7. Set tag2=h2 8. Output TLP=(st0,tag1,tag2) Publicly Verify solution m, to TLP 1. Parse TLP= (st0,tag1,tag2) 2. Compute stT with and repeat Steps 2, 3, 4 and 5 from the Solve procedure.

  12. Output Independent Abort, Beacons and MPC The adversary must decide whether to abort before seeing the output, so it cannot bias the output or use it for rational strategies. Last protocol messages sent inside a TLP. The adversary must send its own TLP before honest TLPs are solved or else an abort is detected. The adversary cannot use the output to make the decision of sending her TLP. Applications: fair coin-tossing and randomness beacons, better MPC with financial incentives. TLP TLP TLP

  13. Efficient Randomness Beacons from PV TLPs A RANDAO style beacon that is provably unbiasable, informally: 1. All parties Pi broadcast TLPi containing ri to be solved in T ticks with T larger than the broadcast delay. 2. After waiting for broadcast delay ticks, party Pi reveals ri,tdi and waits for other parties to do the same (parties who did not broadcast are ignored). 3. If a party Pa does not reveal ra,tda, the other parties obtain it from TLPa. 4. Final randomness is the XOR of all ri from valid TLPi (invalid are discarded). Parties can be forced to make security deposit to participate and lose this deposit if they don t voluntarily open their TLPs.

  14. Open Questions UC Compiler for (partial) fairness and efficient OIA for generic functionalities Homomorphic UC TLPs and VDFs Applications to time sensitive transactions on cryptocurrencies and time bounds on blockchain ledgers

  15. CRAFT: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/784.pdf

More Related Content