Explore strategies like rerouting, padding, delaying, and message segmentation to enhance the security of traffic matrices and prevent information leakage to adversaries. Discover action plans and valuable resources in the field.
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Presentation Transcript
Making the Neutral Traffic Matrix More Meaningful Joseph Choi
Given a global passive adversary, want to prevent the adversary from deriving information from observed traffic patterns. Currently, produce a Neutral TM by: (1) Rerouting, (2) Padding, and (3) Delaying Padding acts as a placeholder. Holds no meaning Increases traffic load Is there something better?
Segmenting Messages Instead of rerouting entire messages, is it reasonable to split them up? Every exchange within the network will serve a purpose in sender-to-receiver delivery Non-active nodes aren t pressured to create artificial traffic and can focus on rerouting Considerations: Additional processing cost mainly incurred to sender and receiver Coordinating rerouting of both entire messages and segmented messages
Action Plan I. Discovery Neutral TM creation/agreement among parties 3 traditional means Existing alternate methods 1) 2) 3) II. Build a new set of tools Come up with new ideas Implementation of new ideas 1) 2) III. Experimentation & Measurement Build neutral, observed TM from actual TM Build set of compatible TMs to observed TM 1) 2)
Resources: Richard E. Newman, Ira S. Moskowitz, Paul Syverson and Andrei Serjantov. Metrics for Traffic Analysis Prevention, In PET 2003, Dresden, March 2003. R.E. Newman-Wolfe and B.R. Venkatraman. High Level Prevention of Traffic Analysis, Seventh Annual Computer Security and Applications Conference, San Antonio, Texas, December 2-6, 1991, pp. 102-109. B.R. Venkatraman and R.E. Wolfe. Capacity Estimation and Auditability of Network Covert Channels, 1995 IEEE Computer Society Symp. Security and Privacy, pp. 186-198. X. Fu, B. Graham, Y. Guan, R. Bettati and W. Zhao. NetCamo: Camouflaging Network Traffic for Real-Time Applications, Texas Workshop Security of Information Systems, April 2003. Yin Zhang, Matthew Roughan, Carsten Lund, and David Donoho. An information-theoretic approach to traffic matrix estimation, 2003 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications, Karlsruhe, Germany, August 25-29, 2003. Questions?
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