Exploring Primitive Normativity and Disposition in Philosophical Discourse

Primitive Normativity and Disposition Haiqiang Dai Beijing Normal University

Overview 1.Anti-skepticism resolution 2. Non-reductionism 3. Partial-communalism/individualism

Let the challenger, however, continue. After all, he says, if I am now so confident that, as I used the symbol'+', my intention was that '68+57' should turn out to denote 125, this cannot be because I explicitly gave myself instructions that 125 is the result of performing the addition in this particular instance. By hypothesis, I did no such thing. But of course the idea is that, in this new instance, I should apply the very same function or rule that I applied so many times in the past. But who is to say what function this was? In the past I gave myself only a finite number of examples instantiating this function. (Kripke, p.8)

xy=x+y, if x,y < 57 =5 otherwise. Wild it indubitably is, no doubt it is false; but if it is false, there must be some fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute it. For although the hypothesis is wild, it does not seem to be a priori impossible. (Kripke, p.9)

The raising of skepticism: There is a new possibility, i.e. the possibility of quaddition. Skeptical Premise: There are multiple possibilities in the previous calculations, and this multiple possibilities can appear anywhere. Skeptical question: Find a fact to determine which rule is to follow.

However, the first segment of the addition is the same as the first segment of the quaddtion. When the possibility of quaddition appears, it means that there is a new trajectory. The evolution of skepticism here is relatively fast, and it requires further illumination: Let s not begin to ask : what facts determine the addition rather than the quaddition. Rather, we ask: Why does quaddition appear? Why is it derailed? What is the reason for the derailment? What is the basis of skepticism?

Premise: There are multiple possibilities in the previous calculations, and this multiple possibilities can appear anywhere. Acontinuous behavior can be explained by multiple rules. (Cf. Wittgenstein) However, the explanations can happen only because this behavior lacks qualifications, or in other words, the qualifications are not taken into consideration. If given conditions, the possibility of interpretations may be greatly reduced, or the premise of skepticism will be questioned, and the construction of skepticism can be rejected from the premise.

First, lets do not find facts to answer skepticism, but think about how to reject the premise of skepticism. The premise of skepticism leads to the derailment of the rule, so is there a way to prevent them from derailing? If you don t derail, skepticism cannot be established. Other strategy: accept the premise, and then find facts. New strategy: do not accept the premise, and find the fact from the beginning. It seems that the new plan also provides fact. However, this strategy starts directly from doubting the skepticism. Compare Wittgenstein: he pointed out that this questioning is due to the possibility of interpretation.

Direct solution; Skeptical solution;Anti-skeptical solution. What we want to ask is: Why is there derailment about 57? In other words, given that the addition segment was done previously, how is it possible that the second segment of the quaddtion appears later? Compared with the previous addition process, what is more here? We want to deny that there is derailment. This strategy allows us to analyze what happened in the previous practice.

The pattern is a regularity. Addition pattern says something like -.-.-.-.-.- Quadditon pattern (the second segment) says something like --- x y=x+y, if x,y < 57 =5 otherwise. Whereas, the rule according to the pattern is something which could be based on the pattern but cannot identical with the pattern.

Always the same has two forms. (1) Same with the simple pattern (2) Same with the rule (super pattern) (1) identical pattern (IP) Addition patter in limited case Identical pattern: The pattern is identical with the next step (addition pattern) (2) identical rule (IR) Addition patter in unlimited case: addition unlimited and quaddtion unlimited. Identical rule: (a) The pattern is identical with the next step (addition rule) (b)The pattern is not identical with the next step (quaddition rule)

For the rule is what we abstract from the pattern. In this case, the rule addition and the rule quaddition are both according to the pattern. (a) The addition continues the pattern. Addition unlimited needs no turn. (b) The quaddtion derives from the pattern. Quaddtion unlimited need a significant turn.

What did I do before? I did the same pattern, not the same rule. What you should do in next step is the same pattern, not the same rule. When you do the same pattern, there is no room for you to jump into another pattern except you have additional reason to do that. (cf. Warren, composite dispositions only have the same structure, but lack the same pattern) When I give 5 to the question 57+68, I do this according to the rule which based on the pattern. At this point, the pattern does not put any restriction on the rule which explains it. I am not do this according to the addition pattern per se. Instead, I do this according to the rule which instantiate quaddition pattern (the second segment).

The construction is not fulfilled. It is only constructed partially. That means that there is some other possibilities. The partiality allows other possibilities intruding. Without normative attitude, the pattern is only a pattern. But there is problem. There is a distinction between past usage and future usage. It is about the pattern per se and the pattern extension.

a) If people want to interpret, then, it is consistent with any possibility. (Skeptical problem) b) With primitive normative attitude, he finished the pattern-rule process partially, namely, he gives the quasi-rule in this process. (Anti-skeptical strategy) c) But with the primitive normativity, it is not fully finished, still need outer determined action, community s action. (Transition process) With outer action, he finishes completely the pattern-rule process, namely, he transfers the quasi-rule to real-rule.

Seeming right and seeming wrong need primitive criterion. Right and wrong need criterion. It is neither useless nor reliable. But it is useful in a weak sense. Primitive normativity It is a sui generis attitude. It is neither a feeling nor a conceptual capacity. Although, it could accompany a feeling and also could be understood as a concept.

Seeming right may be associated with a phenomenal state, but it need not be. (Compare an example of a different sort. When a proof seems right to you, you may be in no particular phenomenal state; your state may simply be that you can find no fault with the proof.) Seeming right is an attitude towards the behaviour. An essential part of it is being open to the possibility of correction. When a process seems right to you, you are open to the possibility that it may no longer seem right to you if a certain sort of event were to occur. We may call the event checking . (John Broome, 2014, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, p.625)

A strong critic: 258. Let s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign S and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. --I first want to observe that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. -- But all the same, I can give one to myself as a kind of ostensive definition! -- How? Can I point to the sensation? -- Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation a and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.

-- But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition serves to lay down the meaning of a sign, doesn t it? -- Well, that is done precisely by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. -- But I commit it to memory can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct.And that only means that here we can t talk about correct .

(1) Asymmetry: The objects of which seeming right and seeming wrong are in charge are not symmetry. For most cases, it is seeming right because of the regularity established by the training process. (2) Uncompletion: The primitive criterion needs check by public criterion. This means that there is a transition between seeming right to right. (3) Fallibility The result of the check shows that some seeming right is not real right.

The primitive normative attitude highlights the addition pattern which allows the addition pattern continue (additional rule), and at the same time blocks the possibility for quaddtion rule. When quaddtion pattern (the second segment) is intruding, the primitive attitude determines/judges that this derivation is seemingly wrong.

New Dualism: Separation between private and public Rule following paradox. Public normativity: Public pattern: a pattern more confirmed and more extended For the check of the primitive normativity From first personal normativity to third personal normativity From subjective criterion to objective criterion

Primitivity normativity lays down the basis for public normativity. It is in no sense to suggest that the public normativity is a priori. If this strategy is correct, then it sets up a bridge between individual aspect and public aspect. So it is neither against Wittgenstein nor against Kripenstein. It not only relieves the tension between individual level and public level, but also makes the whole story more completed.

First, he questions whether there is any fact that I meant plus, not quus, that will answer his sceptical challenge. Second, he questions whether I have any reason to be so confident that now I should answer 125 rather than 5 . (Kripke, p.11) (1) the pattern (regularity in limited case) (2) the primitive normativity (seeming right/seeming wrong)

(1) Infinite problem Pattern can reach out to infinite cases. The rule is established, not a priori. If there is no reason for the deviation of the pattern, it makes no sense to introduce the big skeptical question. The primitive normativity could ensure that the deviation can not easily happen.

(2) Errors problem: There is no error problem as the dispostionism would encounter because this strategy is not reductionism. For the systematical mistake, it allows that this could happen. a For people in our community, the big mistakes could be corrected. b For people out our community, it is about the dream-like skepticism. So it is far from our actual life. c For creature differing with human beings, it is totally a different story.

(3) Normativity problem: I should answer with 125 because I take this to be seeming right according to the past pattern. This is not a problem at all. It should only be noticed that there is a transition process from primitive normativity to general normativity.

Thanks very much!