Fukushima: INSAG's Role in Nuclear Safety and Institutional Defense

Fukushima: A Failure of Institutional Defence in Depth and Nuclear Cultures what should INSAG do? By Mike Weightman

Questions for INSAG? A. How to ensure effective implementation of DID, Safety Standards, etc? B. How do to address underlying institutional and cultural failings illustrated by Fukushima? C. What is the enduring legacy we leave for the future at such a cusp of challenge and opportunity? D. How can INSAG add value? 2

A Cusp of Opportunity and Challenge A new generation of people and nuclear plants is emerging The experience and knowledge of the last 50 years of the civil nuclear industry could be lost Society has and is changing and so are the challenges Darwinian time Duty to pass and embed on the hard won experience, knowledge, culture and values Darwinian Time a time of great change when those who adapt prosper while those who do not wither and die out 3

Defence in Depth what do we mean? Classically, it s about military strategies to defeat a much stronger enemy: Having diverse means not putting all your forces in one block. But also about giving ground to weaken and engulf your enemy with your strongest forces. 4

Defence in Depth what do we mean? Used in castle design for centuries but also attention to siting: 5

Defence in Depth what we mean: Some Principles Multiple layered defence Independence of Barriers but not provisions (walls made the same) Sub- barriers (arrows, spears, hot oil, stones) built on principles of: diversity redundancy segregation no single point failure But balance of barriers reflecting finite resources and all barriers depend on human beings 6

Technical Defence In Depth - Generally Described in Five Levels Level of defence in depth Level 1 Plant Status Objective Essential Means Normal Operation Prevention of abnormal operation and failures by design Conservative design, construction, maintenance and operation in accordance with appropriate safety margins, engineering practices and quality levels Operational Occurrences Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures Control, limiting and protection systems and other surveillance features Level 2 Accidents Control of accidents within the design basis Control of severe plant conditions in which the design basis may be exceeded, including the prevention of fault progression and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents Engineered safety features and accident procedures Additional measures and procedures to prevent or mitigate fault progression and for on-site emergency management Level 3 Beyond Design Base Accidents e.g. core melt accident Level 4 Significant off site release of radioactivity Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant releases of radioactive materials Emergency management and on-site and off-site emergency response Level 5 7 7

Real basic lesson of Fukushima is that Technical DiD can be subject to common mode failure through Nuclear Safety Institutional System Failures: Inadequate Defence in Depth of the Nuclear Safety Institutional System 8

Fukushima A lack of defence in depth of the Nuclear Safety Institutional System Inadequate design basis for external events Inadequate internal challenge within TEPCO Inadequate peer group challenge from Japanese nuclear industry or from international peers Inadequate challenge from Japanese regulator Inadequate outcome from peer review of the regulator Inadequate challenge from stakeholders Underlying cultural and institutional failings 9

Conclusion Technical defence in depth approach and principles are basically sound Not applied properly nor where standards and reviews Nuclear Institutional System did not address failing not robust Need to use the same DiD concept and principles to build, assess and review and challenge the Nuclear Institutional Systems worldwide and have a means of ensuring a Nuclear Culture to improve Backed up by a new overarching peer review of a nation s nuclear institutional system undertaken by IAEA and WANO joint teams to review and challenge 10

Nuclear Safety Institutional System Defence in Depth: 3 main barriers Level A Strong competent Industry Level B Strong competent Regulator Level C Strong competent Stakeholders Principle: independence between Levels and underpinned by a strong vibrant safety culture with welcoming challenge, passion to improve, openness and transparency, and accountability as a way of life 11

What do I mean by strong? Inner strength not brute strength: Strong enough to listen and absorb others ideas Strong enough to not be afraid of challenge Strong enough to welcome new ideas and learn from others Strong enough to tell it as it is Strong enough to recognise when you get it wrong and show that you are learning from it David and Goliath Skills, Strategy & Inner Strength for Success 12

What do we mean by a Strong Regulator? Powerful but not looking to express power, in a sense failed if have to enforce although never afraid to do so if circumstances appropriate power is not just legal power but power of arguments, skills, strategy, inner strength, capabilities and values, Not afraid to be proportionate Highest standards of technical and regulator excellence Independence in law, practice and culture but greater independence means need for greater accountability Openness and transparency at core Welcomes challenge and seeking ways to learn and improve Outcome focused Strong values to earn respect 13

Nuclear System Defence in Depth Strong Institutional Nuclear Industry Barrier Components of the Nuclear Industry Barrier in a State or Region I.1 I.2 I.3 I.4 Licensee State/Region Industry Peer Pressure International Industry Peer Pressure/Review International Institutional Review SQEP Technical/Design/ope rational capability Safety Directors Forum, INPO, etc. WANO Missions and Requirements IAEA OSART Missions Independent Nuclear Safety Assessment Nuclear Industry Association, Nuclear Energy Institute, ANS Bilateral/Multilateral Organisations e.g. CANDU Owners Group Nuclear Safety Committee Nuclear Leadership/Culture/Values 14

Nuclear System Defence in Depth Strong Institutional Nuclear Regulator Barrier Components of a Strong Institution Regulatory Barrier R.1 R.2 R.3 R.4 Regulatory Authority Special Outside Technical Advice International Peer Pressure International Peer Reviews World Class Technical/Regulatory Capability E.g. Standing Panel of experts nominated by stakeholders CNI Advisory Panel/ Groupe Permanent d Experts NEA CNRA & CSNI committees and working groups IAEA IRRS missions Organisational Structure with internal standards, assurance, OEF, policy, strategy, etc. Special Expert Topic Groups - Fukushima - Aircraft Crash WENRA reference levels, reviews, groups ENSREG Reviews INRA top regulators Accountability to Governing Body Board, Commission, etc. IAEA Safety Standard meetings, etc. Nuclear Leadership/Culture/Values 15

Nuclear System Defence in Depth Strong Institutional Stakeholder Barrier Components of the Strong Stakeholder Institutional Barrier S.1 S.2 S.3 S.4 S.5 S.6 S.7 Workers Public Parliament National & Local Gov. Neighbours Media NGOs Industry and Regulatory Routine Supply of Information Routine Reports on Activities and Decisions Special Reports on Matters of Interest Responsiveness to Requests for Information Routine and Special Meetings Openness & Transparency, Accountability, Assurance Industry/Regulator Culture and Capability 16

Assuring a Strong Nuclear Safety Institutional System The Model of Strong Nuclear System for a MS cuts across several organisational systems industry, regulators, governments, etc. And topic areas organisational design, government agency structures Not covered in total by Any Existing Review Service Several Review Services touch on Particular Aspects: e.g. OSART, ISCA, IRRS, INIRM But none give a Complete Overview of the System nearest Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Mission used for new entrants mainly Also, need WANO input especially on Industrial corporate structures and cultures, and how industry relates to regulators and stakeholders Not to cut across confidentiality basis for WANO operations Part of the strategic overview for a member state Needs underpinning by effective nuclear leadership and nuclear cultures 17

Proposal 1 New Cross Cutting Strategic Review Service for Nuclear Safety System Based on the Defence in Depth model of the nuclear safety assurance system At high strategic level Using components from existing services and others as needed Run jointly by the IAEA and WANO with help of NEA & others Targeting the organisational, cultural, competence, values, etc. aspects of the system, independence of the barriers and sub-barriers and use of the principles of DiD 18

Proposal 2 Develop Nuclear Ethical Principles and Values with Global Application Nuclear Leadership is key to developing effective nuclear institutions, their culture and values Need common basis for Nuclear Leadership that has universal applicability across societies, cultures, organisations 19

Nuclear Leadership what is it? Setting the vision, culture and values to enable society to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy while ensuring the protection of people, society and the environment: Leadership with humility Based on a strong set of common nuclear ethical principles and values 20

Nuclear Leadership Some Ethical Principles? Nuclear leaders work to ensure the welfare, health and safety of all while safeguarding the environment and sustainability of resources Nuclear Leaders are committed to advancing the wellbeing of society Nuclear leaders hold a privileged and trusted position in society and should demonstrate that they are seeking to serve wider society and are sensitive to stakeholder concerns Nuclear Leaders hold dear justice, integrity and continuous improvement Nuclear Leaders see safety as paramount and exhibit this by their actions and decisions, while working to secure other attributes and benefits 21

Nuclear Leadership Some Values? Inner strength Resilience around a clear vision and strategy Objective, rational, factual, knowledge based decision making Responsiveness Humility Welcoming challenge, listening, learning to continuously improve Being Open and Transparent Seeking to Earn Universal Respect Integrity 22

Welcoming Challenge and seeking to listen, learn and improve Loss of Swedish Vasa Warship in 1628 in first 2km of maiden voyage fear of telling the King that top heavy and need to delay 23

Developing the Nuclear Leaders of Tomorrow Requires an international non-political approach Nuclear Leaders required in all three institutional barriers: Nuclear Industry Nuclear Regulators Nuclear Stakeholders Requires co-operation of range of international and national organisations: IAEA, NEA, WANO Nuclear Industry Companies Nuclear Regulator Groups (e.g. INRA, ENSREG) Stakeholder groupings Universities Nuclear training institutes and consultancies Need for focused action 24

Summary Defence in Depth as a concept for establishing effective barriers is still valid Fukushima teaches us that this it is not sufficient you need an effective Nuclear Safety Institutional System build on the same concept and principles to ensure adequate implementation Major independent barriers in the nuclear system: Strong Nuclear Industry Barrier Strong Nuclear Regulator Barrier Strong Nuclear Stakeholder Barrier Underpinned by nuclear leadership based on common universal nuclear ethical principles and values Need a new IAEA/WANO led review service to ensure such systems are in place worldwide by feeding into Convention Review Meetings 25

Summary At a time of great challenge and opportunity high standards of Nuclear leadership are vital to the continued safe use of nuclear energy to benefit society It is needed in all three institutional nuclear safety barriers: Industry Regulators Stakeholders Developing nuclear leaders for tomorrow is an essential prerequisite for nuclear development and needs to be better driven and co-ordinated It involves instilling a common vision for the safe use of nuclear energy to benefit society, together with the associated nuclear ethical principles and values It needs the combined effort of international and national organisations in a increasingly global nuclear system to ensure a timely cadre of future nuclear leaders Can INSAG provide the basis and be the catalyst? 26

Questions for INSAG A. B. How to ensure effective implementation of DID, Safety Standards, etc? How do we address the underlying institutional and cultural failings illustrated by Fukushima? What is the legacy we leave for the future? How can INSAG add value? C. D. To address these questions, INSAG could be the catalyst in taking forward the development of: Proposal 1: The Nuclear System Model based on DID and a new joint strategic level peer review service to assure its universal adoption Proposal 2: Nuclear safety ethical principles and values for common global use to underpin its effectiveness 27