Hash-Based Signatures

Hash-Based Signatures
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This content discusses the security requirements of hash-based signatures, particularly focusing on XMSS (eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme). It highlights the minimal security requirements of digital signature schemes and the key aspects of XMSS security, such as resistance to chosen message attacks. The content also covers the intractability assumption and the role of collision-resistant hash functions in ensuring digital signature scheme security.

  • Hash-Based Signatures
  • XMSS
  • Security Requirements
  • Digital Signatures
  • Cryptography

Uploaded on Feb 17, 2025 | 0 Views


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  1. Hash-Based Signatures Johannes Buchmann, Andreas H lsung Supported by DFG and DAAD Part X: XMSS Security

  2. XMSS has Minimal Security Requirements

  3. Security Requirements of Current Signature Schemes Intractability assumption Collision resistant hash function Digital signature scheme

  4. Minimal Security Requirement of Signatures Digital signature scheme One-way FF Naor, Yung 1989 Rompel 1990

  5. XMSS has minimal security requirements XMSS Existential unforgeable under chosen message attacks Second-preimage resistant HFF Target-collision resistant HFF Pseudorandom FF XMSS Rompel 1990 H stad, Impagliazzo, Levin, Luby 1999 Goldreich, Goldwasser, Micali 1986 Digital signature scheme One-way FF Naor, Yung 1989 Rompel 1990

  6. Security proof [BDH, PQC 2011] XMSS is EU-CMA PRFF [BDEHR., Africacrypt 2011] WOTS$ is EU-CMA [BDH, PQC 2011] SPR-HFF [ DOTV, PQC 2008] XMSS is forward secure XMSS-Tree + WOTS is EU-CMA

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