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LOGO Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) ShayanZamani & Mojtaba Jafari Mazanadaran University of Science and Technology, Distributed Systems Class Seminar, Supervisor: Hadi Salimi {Sh.zamaniand jafari}@ustmb.ac.ir
Outline 1 Security Challenges 2 Security Principles 3 3 WSN Attacks 4 4 Conclusion 2 Security in WSN
Security Challenges The broadcast nature of the wireless communication. The network deployment in hostile environments (e.g. battlefield, forest) with relatively poor physical protection. The limitations in energy, computational power and memory. The extremely large number of interacting devices in a sensor network. The dynamic nature of WSN (frequent changes in both its topology and its membership) 3 Security in WSN
Security Principles Data Confidentiality: Ensuring that only authorized sensor nodes can access the content of the messages. Data Authentication: Ensuring that the data is originated from the correct source. Data Integrity: Ensuring that any received data has not been altered in transmit by unauthorized parties. Data Freshness: Ensuring that no old messages have been replayed. Availability: Ensuring that services offered by whole WSN or by a single sensor node must be available whenever required. 4 Security in WSN
Type of Attacks From the point of view of how to Attack: Passive: Only monitors the communication channel. Threatens the confidentiality of data. Active: Attempts to delete, add or alter the transmission on the channel. Threatens data integrity, authentication and confidentiality. From the point of view of Attacker s Device: Mote-Class Attacker: Has access to a few nodes with similar capabilities to those deployed in the network. Laptop-Class Attacker: Has access to more powerful devices like a laptop. Has advantages over legitimate nodes like greater battery power, more capable cpu and high-power antenna. From the point of view of penetration to Network: Insider: Has compromised some authorized nodes of the network (stolen key material, run malicious code). Outsider: Has no special access to the network. 5 Security in WSN
Attacks in WSN(1/6) Network Layer Network Layer Attacks Attacks Physical Physical Jamming, Tampering Jamming, Tampering Link Link Collision, Exhaustion, Unfairness Collision, Exhaustion, Unfairness Spoofed, Selective forwarding, Sinkhole, Sybil, Wormholes, Hello flood flood Spoofed, Selective forwarding, Sinkhole, Sybil, Wormholes, Hello Network and Routing Network and Routing Transport Transport Flooding, Desynchronization Flooding, Desynchronization 6 Security in WSN
Attacks in WSN(2/6) Physical Layer Jamming: Interference with the radio frequencies a network's nodes are using. 7 Security in WSN
Attacks in WSN(3/6) Data Link Layer Collision: Altering of transmission octets to disrupt the packets. (checksum mismatch) 8 Security in WSN
Attacks in WSN(4/6) Network Layer Sinkhole: The adversary attracts the surrounding nodes with unfaithful routing information. 9 Security in WSN
Attacks in WSN(5/6) Network Layer Wormhole: The adversary tunnels the traffic received in a part of the network to another. 10 Security in WSN
Attacks in WSN(6/6) Network Layer Sybil attack: A single node presents multiple identities to other nodes. Identity Table: Identity Table: Current = X Current = X,A Current = X,A,C Current = X,A,C,B X,A,C,B,D Identity Table: Identity Table: Identity Table: Current = A F M B C D E N 11 Security in WSN
Conclusion Need for physical network protection (not always possible). Cryptography can provide link layer encryption and authentication mechanisms (MAC) but this is not enough. End to end security mechanisms are impractical. Careful protocol design (routing, localization, data aggregation) with respect to security principles and attacker models. Consideration of energy issues when adapting countermeasures. 12 Security in WSN
References(1/4) 1) S. Ganeriwal, S. Capkun, C.-C. Han, and M. B. Srivastava. Secure time synchronization service for sensor networks. In WiSe 05: Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Wireless security, pages 97 106, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press. 2) L. Lazos and R. Poovendran. Serloc: Robust localization for wireless sensor networks. ACM Trans. Sen. Netw., 1(1):73 100, 2005. 3) A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, V. Wen, and D. E. Culler. Spins: security protocols for sensor networks. Wireless Networking, 8(5):521 534, 2002. 4) Y.Zhou,Y.Fang,Y.Zhang, "Security Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey", IEEE Communication Surveys, Vol.10, No.3, 3rd Quarter 2008. 5) J. M. McCune, Detection of Denial-of-Message Attacks on Sensor Network Broadcasts, Proc. 2005 IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy (SP 05), Oakland, CA, May 2005. 6) J. R. Douceur, The Sybil Attack, Proc. 1st ACM Int l. Wksp. Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS 02), Mar. 2002. 7) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zigbee, Last access 4/5/2010. 8) W. Xu, K. Ma, W. Trappe, and Y. Zhang, Jamming sensor networks: Attack and defense strategies, IEEE Network, vol. 20, no. 3, 2006. 13 Security in WSN
References(2/4) 9. J. Deng, R. Han, and S. Mishra, Defending against path-based DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks, in SASN 05: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, 2005. 10. C. Kraub, M. Schneider, and C. Eckert, Defending against falseendorsement-based DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks, in WiSec: Proc. of the First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, 2008. 11. C. Kraub, M. Schneider, and C. Eckert, An Enhanced Scheme to Defend against False-Endorsement-Based DoS Attacks in WSNs , in IEEE International Conference on Wireless & Mobile Computing, Networking & Communication, 2008 12. K.Kredo and P.Mohapatra, "Medium Access Control in Wireless Sensor Network", Computer Networks, June 2006. 13. Y. WANG, G. ATTEBURY,B. RAMAMURTHY, A SURVEY OF SECURITY ISSUES IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS , 2ND QUARTER 2006, VOLUME 8, NO. 2 14. T. Kavitha, D. Sridharan, Security Vulnerabilities In Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey , Journal of Information Assurance and Security 5 (2010) 031-044, 2009 15. J. Walters, Z. Liang, W. Shi, V. Chaudhary , Wireless Sensor Network Security: A Survey , Auerbach Publications, CRC Press, 2006 16. A. Becher, Z. Benenson, M. Dornseif, Tampering with Motes: Real-World Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks , 2006 14 Security in WSN
References(3/4) 17. A. D. Wood and J. A. Stankovic, Denial of service in sensor networks, IEEE Computer, vol. 35, no. 10, pp. 54 62, 2002. 18. E. Shi and A. Perrig, Designing secure sensor networks, Wireless Communication Magazine, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 38 43, December 2004. 19. C. Karlof and D. Wagner. Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: Attacks and countermeasures. In First IEEE International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications, pages 113 127, May 2003. 20. J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, A.Perrig, The Sybil Attack in Sensor Networks: Analysis & Defenses , Center for Computer and Communications Security, 2004 21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_distribution_in_wireless_sensor_networks, Last access 25/5/2010 22. R. Maheshwari, J. Gao, S. R. Das, "Detecting Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Networks using Connectivity Information" , To appear in IEEE INFOCOM 2007, Alaska 23. L. Hu and D. Evans. Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole attacks. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2004. 24. Y. Hu, A. Perrig and D. Johnson, Packet leashes: A defense against wormhole attacks in wireless networks, Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, vol. 3, pp. 1976, 1986, 2003. 15 Security in WSN
References(4/4) 25. I.Krontiris,Th.Giannetsos,T.Dimitriou, "Launching a Sinkhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks; the Intruder Side", Athens Information Technology, Peania, Athens,Greece. 26. Ch.Tumrongwittayapak, R.Varakulsiripunth, "Detecting Sinkhole Attacks In Wireless Sensor Networks" ,ICROS-SICE International Conference, Aug 2009, Japan. 27. Some Slides Taken from Presentation of Pyrgelis Apostolos, Cryptography and Security in Wireless Sensor Networks , Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics University of Patras, 2009, Greece. 16 Security in WSN
