Obligation and Consent Theories in Political Philosophy
Explore the concepts of obligation and consent theories in political philosophy through the perspectives of Hanna F. Pitkin, John Rawls, and Stanley Cavell. Delve into the philosophical discourse on assessing government, the grammar of consent, the case of promising, and the nature of duties and obligations.
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Presentation Transcript
Hanna F. Pitkin: OBLIGATION AND CONSENT Consent Theory: sources God, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls Pitkin and the doctrine of hypothetical consent Methodology What people really do Socrates and the Nazi official procedural and substantive criteria What are real choices?
The use of examples important that there are lots of different cases who thinks of consent not the blacks, the civil disobedient but Socrates and the official but the official gives us pause about resting things on consent Socrates: here he accepts his obligation to remain but he as also disobeyed: how does he know to what he has consented Cannot be tacit (how would we know) 19 this cannot be a matter of what the majority thinks (but what the majority thinks a matter to consider although this can be evidence (20)
How do we assess a government? Two forms for assessing government procedural (rules followed) substantive (people well treated) BUT: p 44 idea of the grammar of the word obligation suppose I ask why are you ever obliged to obey even legitimate authority --- traditional consent theory takes this for granted: confuses the self assumption of contract with the self assumption of obligation (23)
The grammar of consent The case of promising The place of promising: Rawls and Cavell Deontology Right intentions Teleology What is a duty to do We and our obligations who is to say?
