Observing Unobservable Network Communications in Censorship Circumvention

the parrot is dead observing unobservable network n.w
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The study delves into the challenges posed by Internet censorship on repressive regimes and the need for unobservable circumvention systems. Various techniques like DPI, DNS hijacking, and deep packet inspection are explored, alongside proposed solutions like Parrot systems and SkypeMorph. The emphasis is on ensuring that censors cannot detect circumvention traffic or end-hosts using passive, active, or proactive surveillance methods.

  • Internet censorship
  • Circumvention systems
  • Unobservable communications
  • Censorship evasion
  • Repressive regimes

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  1. The Parrot is Dead: Observing Unobservable Network Communications Amir Houmansadr Chad Brubaker Vitaly Shmatikov

  2. Internet Censorship The Internet is a big threat to repressive regimes! Repressive regimes censor the Internet: IP filtering, DNS hijacking, Deep packet-inspection, etc. Circumvention systems 2

  3. The Internet Censorship Region Allowed Destination X Blocked Destination

  4. The Internet Censorship Region DPI X Blocked Destination

  5. We need unobservable circumvention Censors should not be able to identify circumvention traffic or end-hosts through passive, active, or proactive techniques

  6. Lets hide! The Internet Censorship Region

  7. Parrot systems Imitate a popular protocol SkypeMorph (CCS 12) StegoTorus (CCS 12) CensorSpoofer (CCS 12)

  8. What's, uh... What's wrong with it? 'E's dead, that's what's wrong with it!

  9. SkypeMorph The Internet Censorship Region Traffic Shaping SkypeMorph Client SkypeMorph Bridge A Tor node

  10. SoM header The start of message (SoM) header field is MISSING! Single-packet identifier, instead of sophisticated statistical traffic analysis

  11. SkypeMorph The Internet Censorship Region TCP control SkypeMorph Bridge SkypeMorph Client A Tor node

  12. No, no.....No, 'e's stunned!

  13. SkypeMorph+ Let s imitate the missing! Hard to mimic dynamic behavior Active/proactive tests

  14. Dropping UDP packets

  15. Other tests Test Skype SkypeMorph+ Flush Supernode cache Drop UDP packets Serves as a SN Rejects all Skype messages No reaction Burst of packets in TCP control Ends the UDP stream Close TCP channel No reaction Delay TCP packets Reacts depending on the type of message Initiates UDP probes No reaction Close TCP connection to a SN Block the default TCP port No reaction Connects to TCP ports 80 and 443 No reaction

  16. Now that's what I call a dead parrot.

  17. StegoTorus The Internet Censorship Region HTTP HTTP Skype StegoTorus Client StegoTorus Bridge A Tor node Ventrilo HTTP

  18. StegoTorus chopper Dependencies between links

  19. StegoTorus-Skype The same attacks as SkypeMorph Even more attacks!

  20. StegoTorus-HTTP Does not look like a typical HTTP server! Most HTTP methods not supported!

  21. CensorSpoofer The Internet Censorship Region SIP server Spoofer Censored destination RTP downstream RTP upstream CensorSpoofer Client Dummy host

  22. SIP probing The Internet Censorship Region SIP server Spoofer Censored destination RTP downstream RTP upstream CensorSpoofer Client Dummy host

  23. No no! 'E's pining! 'E's not pinin'! 'E's expired and gone to meet 'is maker!

  24. Lesson 1 Unobservability by imitation is fundamentally flawed!

  25. Imitation Requirements Correct SideProtocols IntraDepend InterDepend Err Network Content Patterns Users Geo Soft OS

  26. Lesson 2 Partial imitation is worse than no imitation!

  27. Alternative Do not imitate, but Run the target protocol IP over Voice-over-IP [NDSS 13] Challenge: efficiency

  28. Thanks

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