Secure Distributed Systems Using Sandbox Technology

This seminar explores the potential of sandbox technology for ensuring security in distributed systems. The research by Arash Karami, supervised by Hadi Salimi, delves into the practical applications and benefits of this approach. By examining the challenges and opportunities in implementing sandbox technology, the study sheds light on a promising method for securing distributed systems. For more information, contact arashkarami88@gmail.com.

• Sandbox Technology
• Secure Systems
• Distributed Systems
• Security
• Seminar

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1. Sandbox technology, a suitable approach for secure distributed systems By: Arash Karami Supervisor : Hadi Salimi Distributed Systems Course Seminar arashkarami88@gmail.com July 2010 Mazandaran University of Science and Technology IT department

2. Main Contents 2/36 What: Sandbox security Where: General-purpose Grid computing Why: security with lightweight overhead, How: see those in next parts!!! Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

3. Table of Content 3/36 Introduction Sandbox idea Other concepts Usages Features Interception Interception Levels Access Control List Chroot mechanism Applications Evaluating Time line Conclusion Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

4. Introduction 4/36 Motivation Introduction My purpose Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

5. Motivation 5/36 large scale systems need to be high performance Distributed system are normally untrusted environments Establishing secure processing environments is very time consuming (common) We have found a suitable technology for lightweight secure environemnts in large scale systems 2000 1990 2010 Standalone Antivirus Security suits ` Sandboxes Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

6. Introduction to sandbox 6/36 By wikipedia: In computer security, a sandbox is a security mechanism for separating running programs. It is often used to execute untested code, or untrusted programs from unverified third-parties, suppliers and untrusted users. By common: Process virtual machine By my survey: A jail that can override and modify the behaviour of system calls without change in real system Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

7. Purposes & specifics 7/36 Lightweight High performance Virtualization Role based Special ACL Control and management resource Restriction in resources Better than complex authentications Self defensive Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

8. The sandbox idea 8/36 Idea Other concepts Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

9. Other means 9/36 Sandbox games Google sandbox rating Sandboxes have many applications in computer science!!! The sandbox tool aims to fulfill the need for application security on a distributed environment Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

10. usages 10 Sandbox in X computing Sandbox as virtual machine Sandbox as monitoring tools (EVEN) Sandbox as IDS ;) Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

11. Usage of sandboxes monitoring tools, Network traffic control Network FVM 11/36 IDS BlueBox Resource Management systems Chromium Java sandbox Virtualization Anti viruses Norman Avast Mobile computing Mobile codes Sandbox approach Rule base management systems Honey pots Full virtualization EVM Gridbox DGMonitor Janus Cloud/Grid computing FVM Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

12. Features 12/36 Interception Access Control List Application sandboxes Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

13. Interception 13/36 Base of sandboxes Process interception system call interception Os: Unix: ptrace OR Windows: dll injection Monitoring resources and controlling them Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

14. User level sandbox 14/36 Trace system calls Using ptrace in Unix Using injection to address space of processes in windows. For example: Gridbox Chromium sandbox project Chroot Janus Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

15. Kernel level sandbox 15/36 Create a driver or kernel modules for a specific platform Low level programming Dirty programming!!! Non-hacked (than to user mode) For example BlueBox EVM Condor Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

16. Access Control List 16/36 Assign a task, role, system call Change system call with real system call Example: Gridbox: Define acl.c + syscalls.c for resource management Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

17. Application sandboxes 17/36 Move desktop app to web app Protecting with lightweight , secure, flexible approach (WHERE???) Extension or separated program Sandboxie A part of Applets SilverLight Lost real performance Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

18. Present two prof sandbox 18 GridBox Chromium sandbox project Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

19. Gridbox 19/36 started at 2005 Lightweight code files & executable file Heterogeneous on Unix base system User mode interception Used in ProGrid, SETI@ Using ACL Multi level security Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

20. Multi level security 20/36 # Program execution` # Allow execution of /bin/cat rule system allow /bin/cat # Disallow any other program execution rule system deny * # Network access: Allow connections to trusted machines rule connect allow 200.18.98.120:80 rule connect allow 200.18.98.132:80 # Disallow any other connection rule connect deny *:* # Serving connections: Allow to bind to port 8000 of interface 200.18.98.120 rule bind allow 200.18.98.120:8000 # Disallow any other port binding rule bind deny * GRIDBOX: connect (200.18.98.120:80): DENIED GRIDBOX: nice(10): DENIED GRIDBOX: connect (200.18.98.120:22): DENIED GRIDBOX: system (/bin/rm): DENIED GRIDBOX: fopen (/etc/passwd): DENIED Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami # Node profile # Limit the CPU use to 5 minutes limit CPU_TIME 600 # Limit maximum file size limit FILE_SIZE 1000000 # Limit maximum process stack limit STACK 20000 #/usr/local/grid/sandbox.sh /usr/local/grid/applications/test_suite ...GRIDBOX: fopen (input): DENIED

21. GridBox Functionalities 21/36 Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

22. Chromium Sandbox project 22 Subset of Chromium open source project Independent to Google codes Cross-platform Restriction in: process I/O Network Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

23. Evaluate 23/36 Table of all surveyed sandboxes Time-line Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

24. Compression 24/36 Sandbox is a wide concept It is based of interception Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

25. Some surveyed sandboxes 25/36 Sandbox name Goal Implantation Level Heterogon ous Compatible OS Application Domain Program Chroot OS virtualization User mode No Most Unix-like OS Secure policy Chroot Gridbox Improve security in grid User mode Y/N All Unix-like OS Grid computing, Pro Grid,SETI@ ACL, customize confige file, BlueBox N IDS Kernel mode No Linux Network IDS, Host base real time IDS, webservers Host base driven DGMonitor Virtualized resources User mode Yes Linux,windows, Unix Entropia, DCGrid,Xterm web Portable, Entropia VM Virtualization Kernle mode No Windows NT or higher Grid systems, image processing Combine VM approach with Sandbox approach, File Virtualzaiton, Thread mng,Job manager Janus Monitoring User mode No Solaris 2.4 Ptrace/proc mechanism Chromium Sandboxing User mode Yes Unix-like, windows Web application

26. Time-Line 26 Progress sandboxes Systrace chromium Condor Gridbox Avast Janus FreeBSD Jail Chroot 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

27. Result 27/36 Result challenges discussion Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

28. A good sandbox properties: 28/36 Interception without restriction on resources A secure box for virtual processes Multi part restriction: Memory restriction: Restriction space for Processes, threads process management monitoring network protocols Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

29. challenges 29/36 Implement level Goal Cross-platform Fine-grained level Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

30. Conclusion 30/36 Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

31. Today we need to: 31/36 A cross platform sandbox 1. 2. High performance 3. Support kernel and user mode sandboxing 4. Dynamic ACL (Google ACL)s 5. Full virtualization 6. Limited local resource and network resource 7. Open source Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

32. Discussion 32/36 Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

33. References 33/36 Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

34. All references 34 S Loureiro, R Molva, Y Roudier 2000 Mobile Code Security Proceedings of ISYPAR AR.Butt, S.Adabala, NH.Kapadia, RJ.Figueiredo and J.A.B.Fortes Grid-computing portals and security issues Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, October 2003 H.Chen, P.Liu, R.Chen, B.Zang, H.Chen, P.Liu, R.Chen VMM-based Process Shepherding Parallel Processing Institute Technical Report Number: FDUPPITR-2007-08002 August 2007 I.Goldberg, D.Wagner, R.Thomas, EA.Brewer A Secure Environment for Untrusted Helper Applications Conning the Wily Hacker Sixth USENIX UNIX security symposium, July 1996 By Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_%28computer_security%29t 2010-07-14 J. Lange, P. Dinda, Transparent Network Services via a Virtual Traffic Layer for Virtual Machines, Proceedings of the 16th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC 2007), June, 2007 CHARI, S. N., AND CHENG, P.-C. BlueBoX: A Policy-driven, Host-Based Intrusion Detection System. In Proceedings of the 9th Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS 2002) (2002). T.Khatiwala, R.Swaminathan, V. N.Venkatakrishnan Data Sandboxing: A Technique for Enforcing Confidentiality Policies , Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, p.223-234, December 11-15, 2006 Frey, J. Tannenbaum, T. Livny, M. Foster, I. Tuecke, S. Condor-G: A Computation Management Agent for Multi-Institutional Grids cluster computing, 2002, VOL 5; NUMBER 3, pages 237-246 P. Cicotti, M.Taufer and A. Chieny DGMonitor: A Performance Monitoring Tool for Sandbox-Based Desktop Grid Platforms journal of supercomputing, 2005, VOL 34; NUMBER 2, pages 113-133 D.Wagner A Secure Environment for Untrusted Helper Applications Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami http://searchsystemschannel.techtarget.com/generic/0,295582,sid99_gci1379901,00.html

35. 35 http://www.jpgronews.com/insiderreports/2004/05/06/google-sandbox-effect-revealed Evgueni Dodonov , Joelle Quaini Sousa , H lio Crestana Guardia, GridBox: securing hosts from malicious and greedy applications, Proceedings of the 2nd workshop on Middleware for grid computing, p.17-22, October 18-22, 2004, Toronto, Ontario, Canada S.Santhanam, P.Elango, A.Arpaci-Dusseau ,M.Livny "Deploying virtual machines as sandboxes for the grid" Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Real, Large Distributed Systems, 2005 Jiang, X. Wang, X. "Out-of-the-Box" Monitoring of VM-Based High-Interaction Honeypots lecture notes in computer science , 2007 Malkhi, D. Reiter, M. K Secure Execution of Java Applets Using a Remote Playground IEEE transactions on software engineering, 2000 M.Khambatti, P.Dasgupta, KD.Ryu A Role-Based Trust Model for Peer-to-Peer Communities and Dynamic Coalitions In IWIA '04: Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Information Assurance Workshop, page 141, Washington, DC, USA, 2004 The Technion DSL Lab, Israel Condor Local File System Sandbox high level design document B Calder, AA Chien, J Wang, D Yang ,The Entropia Virtual Machine for Desktop Grids Proceedings of the 1st ACM/USENIX international conference on Virtual execution environments, 2005 David A. Wagner. Janus: an Approach for Confinement of Untrusted Applications. Technical Report CSD-99-1056, 12, 1999. 2, 8 N.Provos Improving host security with system call policies Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, 2003 sandboxie http://www.sandboxie.com/ Chromium project http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcode.google.com%2Fchromium%2F& ei=Qs49TI_NJ5i8jAerqZT5Aw&usg=AFQjCNFFIW41N_oxaGVfvEf4kTPmYqUfWg&sig2=Af2KdebPFzPOcyA-wSUAVQ Sandbox technology present by Arash Karami

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