Subverting Bitcoin

Subverting Bitcoin
Slide Note
Embed
Share

Delve into the intricate world of Bitcoin mining, consensus mechanisms, and Nash equilibrium. Explore the implications of the 51% attack, selfish mining strategies, and the delicate balance required to maintain the stability of the cryptocurrency. Uncover the nuances of conflicting blocks, the importance of hash power majority, and the potential risks posed by malicious actors seeking to disrupt the network.

  • Bitcoin
  • Mining
  • Consensus
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Cryptocurrency

Uploaded on Feb 16, 2025 | 1 Views


Download Presentation

Please find below an Image/Link to download the presentation.

The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author.If you encounter any issues during the download, it is possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

You are allowed to download the files provided on this website for personal or commercial use, subject to the condition that they are used lawfully. All files are the property of their respective owners.

The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Subverting Bitcoin David Evans and Samee Zahur

  2. Mining Why do we need miners?

  3. Conflicting Blocks

  4. Consensus Majority of hashing power has voted for transactions on longest chain. It is costly to increase voting power Players are not motivated to cheat

  5. The 51% attack! If any party controls majority of hashing power, they can: Undo the past Deny mining rewards Undermine the currency

  6. Nash Equilibrium Or, can selfish miners keep Bitcoin stable?

  7. Nash equilibrium It is a configuration of strategies such that no participant can do better by unilaterally changing their own strategy.

  8. Prisoners Dilemma B B stays loyal 1,1 0,3 B B defects 3,0 2,2 A A stays loyal A A defects

  9. Bitcoin mining equilibrium?

  10. Selfish mining

  11. Ill keep these blocks for myself!

  12. Ill keep these blocks for myself!

  13. if we gain a lead: withhold blocks mine on private chain else if lead shrinks, but is still at least 2: reveal blocks to keep abreast with public chain else if lead drops below 2: reveal all blocks mine on public chain

  14. Worries Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable Ittay Eyal, and Emin G n Sirer

  15. Reaction

  16. Detecting selfishness Orphaned blocks Timing hints More at: How to detect selfish miners by Ittay Eyal, and Emin G n Sirer, http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/01/15/detecting-selfish- mining/

  17. Next up Revised checkup 2 answers Next class: mining pools

More Related Content